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ESSAYS
The Constitution's Bicentennial:
Commemorating the Wrong
Document?
The Honorable Thurgood Marshall*
1987 marks the 200th anniversary of the United States Consti-
tution. A Commission has been established to coordinate the cele-
bration. The official meetings, essay contests, and festivities have
begun.
The planned commemoration will span three years, and I am
told 1987 is "dedicated to the memory of the Founders and the
document they drafted in Philadelphia."' We are to "recall the
achievements of our Founders and the knowledge and experience
that inspired them, the nature of the government they established,
its origins, its character, and its ends, and the rights and privileges
of citizenship, as well as its attendant responsibilities."2
Like many anniversary celebrations, the plan for 1987 takes
particular events and holds them up as the source of all the very
best that has followed. Patriotic feelings will surely swell, prompt-
ing proud proclamations of the wisdom, foresight, and sense of jus-
tice shared by the Framers and reflected in a written document
now yellowed with age. This is unfortunate-not the patriotism it-
* Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court. Justice Marshall delivered this
speech on May 6, 1987, at the Annual Seminar of the San Francisco Patent and Trademark
Law Association in Maui, Hawaii. These remarks are reprinted in the Vanderbilt Law Re-
view with his permission.
1. Commission on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, First Full
Year's Report, at 7 (Sept. 1986).
2. Commission on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, First Report, at
6 (Sept. 17, 1985).
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self, but the tendency for the celebration to oversimplify, and over-
look the many other events that have been instrumental to our
achievements as a nation. The focus of this celebration invites a
complacent belief that the vision of those who debated and com-
promised in Philadelphia yielded the "more perfect Union" it is
said we now enjoy.
I cannot accept this invitation, for I do not believe that the
meaning of the Constitution was forever "fixed" at the Philadel-
phia Convention. Nor do I find the wisdom, foresight, and sense of
justice exhibited by the Framers particularly profound. To the
contrary, the government they devised was defective from the
start, requiring several amendments, a civil war, and momentous
social transformation to attain the system of constitutional govern-
ment, and its respect for the individual freedoms and human
rights, we hold as fundamental today. When contemporary Ameri-
cans cite "The Constitution," they invoke a concept that is vastly
different from what the Framers barely began to construct two
centuries ago.
For a sense of the evolving nature of the Constitution we need
look no further than the first three words of the document's pre-
amble: "We the People." When the Founding Fathers used this
phrase in 1787, they did not have in mind the majority of
America's citizens. "We the People" included, in the words of the
Framers, "the whole Number of free Persons." On a matter so ba-
sic as the right to vote, for example, Negro slaves were excluded,
although they were counted for representational purposes-at
three-fifths each. Women did not gain the right to vote for over a
hundred and thirty years.4
These omissions were intentional. The record of the Framers'
debates on the slave question is especially clear: The Southern
States acceded to the demands of the New England States for giv-
ing Congress broad power to regulate commerce, in exchange for
the right to continue the slave trade. The economic interests of the
regions coalesced: New Englanders engaged in the "carrying trade"
would profit from transporting slaves from Africa as well as goods
produced in America by slave labor. The perpetuation of slavery
ensured the primary source of wealth in the Southern States.
Despite this clear understanding of the role slavery would play
in the new republic, use of the words "slaves" and "slavery" was
3. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2 (Sept. 17, 1787).
4. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIX (ratified 1920).
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carefully avoided in the original document. Political representation
in the lower House of Congress was to be based on the population
of "free Persons" in each State, plus three-fifths of all "other Per-
sons." 5 Moral principles against slavery, for those who had them,
were compromised, with no explanation of the conflicting princi-
ples for which the American Revolutionary War had ostensibly
been fought: the self-evident truths "that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalien-
able Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness."6
It was not the first such compromise. Even these ringing
phrases from the Declaration of Independence are filled with irony,
for an early draft of what became that Declaration assailed the
King of England for suppressing legislative attempts to end the
slave trade and for encouraging slave rebellions.7 The final draft
adopted in 1776 did not contain this criticism. And so again at the
Constitutional Convention eloquent objections to the institution of
slavery went unheeded, and its opponents eventually consented to
a document which laid a foundation for the tragic events that were
to follow.
Pennsylvania's Gouverneur Morris provides an example. He
opposed slavery and the counting of slaves in determining the ba-
sis for representation in Congress. At the Convention he objected
that
the inhabitant of Georgia [or] South Carolina who goes to the coast of Africa,
and in defiance of the most sacred laws of humanity tears away his fellow
creatures from their dearest connections and damns them to the most cruel
bondages, shall have more votes in a Government instituted for protection of
the rights of mankind, than the Citizen of Pennsylvania or New Jersey who
views with a laudable horror, so nefarious a practice.8
And yet Gouverneur Morris eventually accepted the three-fifths
accommodation. In fact, he wrote the final draft of the Constitu-
tion, the very document the Bicentennial will commemorate.
As a result of compromise, the right of the Southern States to
continue importing slaves was extended, officially, at least until
1808. We know that it actually lasted a good deal longer, as the
Framers possessed no monopoly on the ability to trade moral prin-
5. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2 (Sept. 17, 1787).
6. Declaration of Independence (July 4, 1776).
7. See C. BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF
POLITICAL IDEAS 147 (1942).
8. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 222 (M. Farrand ed. 1911).
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ciples for self-interest. But they nevertheless set an unfortunate
example. Slaves could be imported, if the commercial interests of
the North were protected. To make the compromise even more
palatable, customs duties would be imposed at up to ten dollars
per slave as a means of raising public revenues. 9
No doubt it will be said, when the unpleasant truth of the his-
tory of slavery in America is mentioned during this Bicentennial
year, that the Constitution was a product of its times, and embod-
ied a compromise which, under other circumstances, would not
have been made. But the effects of the Framers' compromise have
remained for generations. They arose from the contradiction be-
tween guaranteeing liberty and justice to all, and denying both to
Negroes.
The original intent of the phrase, "We the People," was far
too clear for any ameliorating construction. Writing for the Su-
preme Court in 1857, Chief Justice Taney penned the following
passage in the Dred Scott case,10 on the issue whether, in the eyes
of the Framers, slaves were "constituent members of the sover-
eignty," and were to be included among "We the People":
We think they are not, and that they are not included, and were not intended
to be included....
They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an
inferior order; and altogether unfit to associate with the white race... ; and
so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to
respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery
for his benefit.
[A]ccordingly, a negro of the African race was regarded ... as an article
of property, and held, and bought and sold as such. . . . [N]o one seems to
have doubted the correctness of the prevailing opinion of the time."
And so, nearly seven decades after the Constitutional Conven-
tion, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the prevailing opinion of the
Framers regarding the rights of Negroes in America. It took a
bloody civil war before the thirteenth amendment could be
adopted to abolish slavery, though not the consequences slavery
would have for future Americans.
While the Union survived the Civil War, the Constitution did
not. In its place arose a new, more promising basis for justice and
equality, the fourteenth amendment, ensuring protection of the
9. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9 (Sept. 17, 1787).
10. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 405, 407-08 (1857).
11. Id. at 407-08.
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life, liberty, and property of all persons against deprivations with-
out due process, and guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.
And yet almost another century would pass before any significant
recognition was obtained of the rights of black Americans to share
equally even in such basic opportunities as education, housing, and
employment, and to have their votes counted, and counted equally.
In the meantime, blacks joined America's military to fight its wars
and invested untold hours working in its factories and on its farms,
contributing to the development of this country's magnificent
wealth and waiting to share in its prosperity.
What is striking is the role legal principles have played
throughout America's history in determining the condition of Ne-
groes. They were enslaved by law, emancipated by law, disen-
franchised and segregated by law; and, finally, they have begun to
win equality by law. Along the way, new constitutional principles
have emerged to meet the challenges of a changing society. The
progress has been dramatic, and it will continue.
The men who gathered in Philadelphia in 1787 could not have
envisioned these changes. They could not have imagined, nor
would they have accepted, that the document they were drafting
would one day be construed by a Supreme Court to which had
been appointed a woman and the descendent of an African slave.
"We the People" no longer enslave, but the credit does not belong
to the Framers. It belongs to those who refused to acquiesce in
outdated notions of "liberty," "justice," and "equality," and who
strived to better them.
And so we must be careful, when focusing on the events which
took place in Philadelphia two centuries ago, that we not overlook
the momentous events which followed, and thereby lose our proper
sense of perspective. Otherwise, the odds are that for many Ameri-
cans the Bicentennial celebration will be little more than a blind
pilgrimage to the shrine of the original document now stored in a
vault in the National Archives. If we seek, instead, a sensitive un-
derstanding of the Constitution's inherent defects, and its promis-
ing evolution through 200 years of history, the celebration of the
"Miracle at Philadelphia" 12 will, in my view, be a far more mean-
ingful and humbling experience. We will see that the true miracle
was not the birth of the Constitution, but its life, a life nurtured
through two turbulent centuries of our own making, and a life em-
12. C. BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA. THE STORY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVEN-
TION, MAY TO SEPTEMBER. 1787 (1966).
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bodying much good fortune that was not.
Thus, in this Bicentennial year, we may not all participate in
the festivities with flag-waving fervor. Some may more quietly
commemorate the suffering, struggle, and sacrifice that has tri-
umphed over much of what was wrong with the original document,
and observe the anniversary with hopes not realized and promises
not fulfilled. I plan to celebrate the Bicentennial of the Constitu-
tion as a living document, including the Bill of Rights and the
other amendments protecting individual freedoms and human
rights.
